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Abstract
Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) is a new approach developed to integrate the
modeling and analysis of the hardware and software components of an embedded system.
The objective is to complement the traditional approaches which generally follow the
philosophy of separating out the hardware and software portions of the assurance analysis.
In this paper, the DFM approach is demonstrated using the Titan II Space Launch Vehicle
Digital Flight Control System. The hardware and software portions of this embedded
system are modeled in an integrated framework. In addition, the time dependent behavior
and the switching logic can be captured by this DFM model. In the modeling process,
it is found that constructing decision tables for software subroutines is very time
consuming. A possible solution is suggested. This approach makes use of a well-known
numerical method, the Newton-Raphson method, to solve the equations implemented in
the subroutines in reverse. Convergence can be achieved in a few steps.
ix • ._\\\

I. Introduction
This report discusses the modeling of the Titan II Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) Digital
Flight Control System (DFCS) using Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM). The
eventual objective is to make use of the DFM model to perform a safety analysis of the
system.
The Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System can be classified as an embedded system,
i.e., a system in which the functions of mechanical and physical devices are controlled
and managed by dedicated digital processors and computers. The latter devices, in turn,
execute software routines (often of considerable complexity) to implement specific control
functions and strategies. In the Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System, the Missile
Guidance Computer (MGC), which is the on-board digital processor, monitors and
receives inputs from the electromechanical sensors (the accelerometers, the synchros, and
the attitude rate sensors). The computer then executes the flight control software to
command the mechanical actuators, namely the thrust deflection gimbal actuators. Further
discussion of the Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System can be found in Section 2
and Appendix C.
The Titan II SLV DFCS is used as a test case to demonstrate Dynamic Flowgraph
Methodology (DFM). DFM is a new approach developed to integrate the modeling and
analysis of the hardware and software components of an embedded system. The
approaches that have been proposed and/or developed in the past generally follow the
philosophy of separating out the hardware and software portions of the assurance analysis.
The hardware reliability and safety analysts evaluate the hardware portion of an embedded
system under the artificial assumption of perfect software behavior. The software
analysts, on the other hand, usually attempt to verify or test the correctness of the logic"
implemented and executed by the software against a given set of design specifications,
but do not have any means to verify the adequacy of these specifications against unusual
circumstances developing on the hardware side of the overall system, including hardware
fault scenarios and conditions not explicitly envisioned by the software designer. A
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discussion of the limitations of these traditional approaches is presented in Section 3.
DFM is developed to model and analyze an embedded system in a "systems"
approach. This methodology combines features of an existing technique, Logic
Flowgraph Methodology (LFM), with discrete state transition models. Thus, DFM
provides an inductive (i.e. reverse causality backtracking) analysis capability while at the
same time provides the ability to keep track of the complex dynamic effects associated
with sequential and time dependent software executions and digital control system
behavior. The system analyzed by DFM can either be a design concept or an existing
embedded system. This paper shows the application of DFM to an existing system with
the software available for analysis. An application of DFM to analyze the design of an
embedded system with only the software specifications can be found in [Garrett, 1993].
A discussion of LFM is presented in Appendix A. A brief overview of DFM is given in
Section 4, and a more in-depth discussion of this approach can be found in Appendix B.
The DFM model of the Titan II SLV DFCS is developed. This model captures the
essential functional and time-dependent behavior of the system. The relationships
between the various software and hardware variables in the Titan II system are presented
and the execution of the flight control software of this system is modeled as a series of
discrete state transitions. One of the steps in developing the model is the construction of
decision tables that represent functional relationships between software and/or hardware
parameters. However, the problem of combinatorial explosion arises in constructing the
decision tables for the Titan II software modules and the resulting tables are too big for
storage and easy usage. The approaches to modeling the Titan II SLV DFCS, as well as
the combinatorial explosion problem encountered with the decision construction, are
discussed in Section 5.
It is recognized that sometimes decision tables need not be constructed prior to the
analysis. In many cases, the software module algorithms of the embedded system can be
solved "in reverse" in the inductive (backtracking) analysis, instead of looking up entries
in the relevant decision tables. These software module algorithms can be in the form of
,)
specification equations or the actual implementation code. Thus, the DFM approach can
be applied to either test the design of the embedded system or the actual system itself.
The solving of the software module algorithms makes use of a well-known numerical
method, the Newton-Raphson method, for solving a system of non-linear equations. A
discussion of this approach, as well an example, is presented in Section 6.
4
2. The Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System (DFCS)
Before the discussion of the limitations of traditional reliability and safety analysis
approaches with respect to the Titan II SLV DFCS, and how DFM fills in the deficiencies
found in these approaches, we should take a moment to review the features of the system
that need to be addressed in the analysis. A discussion in greater detail about the "I_itan
II SLV DFCS can be found in Appendix C.
2.1 The Titan II System
The Titan II Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) is a modified Titan II ICBM, which is a two
stage rocket [Martin Marietta, 1988], [Martin Marietta, 1991]. Stage I provides thrust for
the first 150 sec after liftoff to propel the vehicle to the upper atmosphere. After Stage
I separates from the SLV, Stage II ignites to power the vehicle to the orbital height. At
the end of the Stage II thrust decay, the vehicle relies on minor attitude adjustments to
bring itself to the correct orientations for payload release.
The function of the Digital Flight Control System (DFCS) is to stabilize the vehicle
during all phases of flight (launch through payload separation). Vehicle attitude control
is accomplished via thrust vector control (TVC) during powered flight (from liftoff
through Stage II shutdown) and attitude control thrusters during coast flight (from Stage
II shutdown to payload separation). The system also establishes the flight path of the
vehicle by implementing all steering commands issued by the guidance system. It should
be noted that the flight path of the vehicle is not fixed. It is only an optimal path that
balances between excessive gravity loss and overheating.
The Digital Flight Control System consists of:
- The Missile Guidance Computer (MGC) and the Flight Control Software
- The Attitude Rate Sensing System
- The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
- Hydraulic actuators
5
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Figure 2.1 shows a block diagram of the embedded system.
The Inertial Measurement Unit measures the current vehicle orientation and acceleration,
while the Attitude Rate Sensing System determines the pitch rate and yaw rate. The
measurements from these sensors are then used in the flight control software to determine
the appropriate engine nozzle deflection commands to be given to the hydraulic actuators.
A detailed description of each of these sub-systems is presented in Appendix C.
2.2 Features of the Titan II SLV DFCS
The Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System is a complex embedded system consisting
of numerous hardware components and a large software code component. The software
code is made up of more than 50 subroutines, and some of the subroutines have more
than 200 lines of code written in FORTRAN. The execution order of the subroutines is
not fixed; there are numerous switching reflecting maneuvers, shutdown, and changing
stages. In addition, the hardware and software portions of the system are in constant
interaction, with the sensors providing readings to the software, and the software giving
commands to the actuators.
Besides the complexity in size and functions, the system is also dynamic. The software
is executed in interdependent cycles; a minor cycle of 40 ms or 20 ms depending on the
flight stage, and a major cycle of 1 s. The more urgent calculations such as correcting
the flight path and determining the thrust deflections are carried out in the minor cycle,
while the task of controlling the general flight direction is implemented in the major
cycle. Additionally, the program is interrupted every 5 ms for reading inputs from the
sensors, giving outputs to the actuators, or performing telemetry.
In view of the complexity and dynamic features of this system, we need a methodology
that is algorithmic, can handle hardware and software interactions, and can address the
dynamic issues. An algorithmic approach can allow its procedures to be automated. The
capability for automation is especially important for a huge and complex system like the
6
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Titan II SLV DFCS, as the analysis can easily become unmanageable by hand. The last
decade has seen much progress in the development and application of analytical
techniques to identify possible failure modes in complex engineering systems, and, more
recently, even to automatically diagnose faults in real time by means of computer-based
operation aids. The recent advent of expert system technology has opened the door to
easier implementation of well-known techniques such as fault tree analysis, and to the
development of structured knowledge bases on more sophisticated system modeling
frameworks such as influence diagrams and qualitative cause-and-effect models.
In addition to following an algorithmic approach, it is obvious that a methodology without
due regard to hardware/software interactions and dynamic features cannot be expected to
reasonably analyze this system.
8
3. Limitations of Traditional Software Reliability Analysis Techniques
The traditional software reliability techniques under consideration are testing, formal
verification, discrete state simulation, and fault tree analysis. These methodologies are
found to have drawbacks when applied to analyzing the Titan II SLV DFCS. The nature
and extend of these drawbacks are discussed below.
3.1 Testing
Testing is traditionally one of the most important activities carried out to assure that a
given design is, in its actual implementation, complying with certain assigned constraints
and specifications, be they in the realm of "peak performance", safety, or reliability. For
systems such as nuclear reactors, aircraft, and spaceships, where failures threaten life,
testing costs account for as much as 80% of the total manufacturing cost [Beizer, 1990].
This is also true for software systems, where the dominating cost is often not the cost of
designing and programming, but the cost associated with logic and implementation errors:
the cost of detecting them, the cost of correcting them, the cost of designing tests that
discover them, and the cost of running those tests [Beizer, 1990].
In traditional black box testing, the embedded system software is treated as a black box.
Combinations of inputs are fed into the software and the outputs produced are monitored
to discover incorrect behavior. The selection of the input domains to be tested is more
an art than a science. Choosing the inputs is largely based on judgement. Since system
failures usually arise with inputs corresponding to very special circumstances, it is very
likely that these inputs will be overlooked in the testing process.
In addition, the amount of sampling involved in black box testing is very large. As the
software used in the Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System is very complex and
involves numerous switching actions, a huge set of inputs has to be chosen, and these
inputs must cover all the paths reachable via switching actions. The flight control
software operates on more than 50 inputs. Assuming we select 3 values for each input
in testing the flight control software, we have to sample more than 35o times
(approximately7 x 1023times). In reality, we may needmore than3 valuesfor each
input to reasonablycovermostof thereachableexecutionpaths.A taskof this magnitude
is nearly impossibleandcertainly impractical.
The magnitudeof samplinginputs canbe reducedby performingmoduletestingon the
subroutines,interfacetestingbetweenthe subroutines,and then integrating the results.
However,this approachstill involvesexecutingahugesetof input combinations.For the
particular subroutineBLOCK l, which operateson 9 input variables,selecting5 values
for eachinput duringmoduletestingimplies thatwe still needto sample59times(almost
2 million times).
Owing to the difficulty in selectinginputsand the magnitudeof samplingin black box
testing of the whole softwareor module testingof the subroutines,randomtesting is
impractical and almost impossiblewhen appliedto a complex systemlike the Titan H
SLV Digital Flight Control System.
3.2 Formal Verification
Formal verification is another approach to software reliability, and is gaining popularity
in the software community. Formal verification applies logic and mathematical theorems
to prove that certain abstract representations of software, in the form of logic statements
and assertions, are consistent with the specifications expressing the desired software
behavior. Recent work has been directed at developing varieties of this type of technique
specifically for the handling of timing and concurrency problems [Narayana and Aby,
1988], [Razouk and Gorlick, 1989].
Due to the abstract nature of the formalism adopted in formal verification, this approach
is rather difficult to use properly by an analyst without the specialized mathematical
background. In addition, the complexity in size and functions of the software used in the
Titan II SLV DFCS compounds this difficulty. It is not a trivial matter to express this
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flight control softwarewith more than 10,000lines of code in terms of abstractlogic
statements.Finally, formal verificationdoesnot providea frameworkfor modelingand
analyzinghardware/softwareinteractions,which is an importantissuein analyzingthe
Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control Systemasmentionedearlier in Section2.
3.3 Discrete State Simulation
The third type of approach to software assurance is directed at analyzing the timing and
logic characteristics of software executions by means of discrete state simulation. In a
discrete state simulation, a model is developed to represent the possible paths and states
of a software system. The analyst then specifies an initial condition and simulates the
behavior of the system in the model. The purpose is to check that the initial condition
cannot lead to failure. This approach uses modeling techniques of various types, such as
queuing networks and Petri nets [Dummer, Reiche, and Hura, 1991], [Morgan and
Razouk, 1987], [Murata, 1989], [Leveson and Stolzy, 1987].
For example, in a Petri net analysis, a model is first developed to describe the possible
states of a system, and how the system can change from one state to another. This Petri
net model is made up of places, transitions, input functions, and output functions.
The places are used to represent states of the sub-modules making up the system. Hence,
a combination of places characterizes a particular state of the system. To help visualize
this, tokens can be put into these places. Thus, a particular distribution of tokens in the
places represent a particular state of a system.
Transitions link the places together to represent the change of states of the sub-modules.
The mapping between the input places and the output places for a transition is described
by its input function and output function. A transition is enabled when each of its input
places has at least one token. The change of state is modeled by removing the tokens
from the input places and depositing them into the output places. Thus, the distribution
of the tokens among the places is altered, representing a jump from one system state to
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another.
Oncethis Petri net model is established,the analystcan definean initial condition for
simulation by specifyinga particulardistribution of tokens. Theenabledtransitionsare
then fired to simulatechangeof stateof thesystem. The newdistribution of thetokens
will enablea new set of transitions,andthe simulationprocessis continued. Thejump
from state to state is summarizedin the form of a reachabilitygraph. This graph
describesthe pathof the systemtransitionand its intermediatesteps. The reachability
graphis thencheckedto seeif a hazardous tate(correspondingto a distinctdistribution
of tokens)canbe reachedfrom the particularinitial condition. A detaileddiscussionof
Petri net analysiscanbe found in [Peterson,1981].
Although this approachcanbeextendedto modelcombinedhardware/softwarebehavior,
difficulties arisefrom the "marchforward" nature(in time andcausality)of this type of
analysis,which forces the analystto assumeknowledgeof the initial conditions from
which a systemsimulationcanbe started. In a largesystemsuchasthe Titan II SLV
DFCS, many combinationsof initial statesexist (as in testing)and the solution space
easilybecomesunmanageable.
3.4 Fault Tree Analysis
Conventional fault tree analysis is very well established in the areas of safety and
reliability analysis. Originally developed at the Bell Laboratories, fault tree analysis has
been used to analyze nuclear power plants [Henley and Kumamoto, 1991] and chemical
processes [Lapp and Powers, 1977]. Fault tree analysis has also been extended to analyze
software systems [Harvey, 1982], [Leveson and Harvey, 1983].
The difficulties in applying fault tree analysis to the Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control
System can be attributed to the technique's limitations in representing dynamic effects.
Fault trees are static diagrams depicting logical combinations of component conditions
which lead to a system failure. For the Titan II embedded system, it is an important issue
12
to addresshow hardwareand/orsoftwareconditionscanevolve over time and lead to
system failures. Unfortunately, this issue is not properly addressedby the fault tree
analysisapproach.
We have seenthat the conventionalsoftwarereliability analysismethodologiesarenot
satisfactorytools for analyzingthe Titan II SLV DFCS. Thesemethodologieslack the
capability to handlehardware/softwareinteraction,or are limited in dynamic modeling
features. A tool which canaddressthe issuesidentifiedearlier in Section2 is needed.
13
14
4. Overview of the Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM)
The Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) has been developed as a tool to model and
analyze embedded systems in a "systems" approach. Both the hardware and software
portions of the embedded system will be represented and analyzed in an integrated
framework. It should be observed that the software portion can be in the form of actual
software codes or software design specifications. Thus DFM can be applied during the
design stage or after the completion of the embedded system. DFM will be tested using
the Titan II SLV DFCS, with the actual software available. Before discussing the DFM
approach to the Titan II embedded system in Section 5, this section provides an overview
of the methodology itself.
DFM is a tool for analyzing embedded systems with the purpose of 1) identifying how
certain postulated events (desirable or undesirable) may occur in a system, and 2)
identifying an appropriate testing strategy based on an analysis of the system's behavior.
DFM is based on the Logic Flowgraph Methodology (LFM) [Guarro and Okrent, 1984],
[Guarro, 1988], [Guarro, 1990], [Muthukumar, Guarro, and Apostolakis, 1991], which is
a concept for analyzing systems with limited dynamic features. The system under
consideration in LFM is represented as a logic network relating process parameters at
steady state. A discussion of the Logical Flowgraph Methodology is presented in
Appendix A. Certain features and rules are added to the LFM to address issues relevant
in embedded system analysis not cover by LFM. These issues are:
1) The need for a framework to represent time transitions. Discrete time transitions
are almost always present in embedded system software, and often present even
in embedded system hardware (eg., as a result of relay actions).
2) The need to identify and represent in a distinguishable fashion the
continuous/functional relations and the discontinuous/discrete logic influences that
are present in embedded systems.
DFM involves two major steps. In the first step, a model of the embedded system that
15
PI_ PAGE BLAr_ NOT FILMED
expresses the logic and dynamic behavior of the embedded system in terms of the
hardware and software parameters is constructed. The model integrates together a
"causality network" that describes the functional relationships among hardware and
software parameters, a "conditional network" which represents discrete software behaviors
due to conditional switching actions and discontinuous hardware performance due to
component failures, and a "time-transition network" that indicates the sequence in which
different software subroutines are executed and different control actions are carried out.
In the second step, the model developed in the f'u-st step is analyzed to determine how the
system can reach a certain state (desirable or undesirable). This is done by developing
"timed" fault trees for given top events (translated in terms of the state(s) of one or more
hardware/software parameters) by backtracking through the model in a systematic manner.
These "timed" fault trees take the form of a sequence of static trees relating the system
parameters at different points in time; essentially a series of snapshots of the system
evolution. All the information required to construct "timed" fault trees is implicitly
contained in the DFM model developed in Step 1. This backtracking process does not
rely on ad-hoc knowledge. In addition, the knowledge base established in Step 1 and the
algorithmic approach in backtracking can allow this process to be completely automated.
Hence, in Step 2, many different "timed" fault trees can be constructed to analyze
different top-events using a single DFM model.
It should be noted that the results of a DFM analysis are obtained in the form of "timed"
fault trees, which show how the investigated system/process states may evolve. The DFM
thus shares, in the final form of the results it provides, some of the features of fault tree
analysis. The differences, however, are that the DFM approach provides a documented
model of the system behavior and interactions, and also a framework to model and
analyze time-dependent behavior, both of which fault tree analysis itself does not provide.
The establishment of a knowledge base, and the capability for automation in this
methodology offers great advantages in analyzing complex embedded systems like the
Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System. Once a DFM model has been developed, it
is not necessary to prepare separate ad-hoc models for each system state of interest (as
16
it is in fault treeanalysis). Also, the dynamiccapabilityof DFM is essentialin handling
the time-dependentbehaviorof the flight control system.
Sincethis paperdealswith themodelingof Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System
usingDFM, theessentialfeaturesfor Step1(ModelConstruction)arepresented.Readers
who areinterestedin Step2 (ModelAnalysis)shouldrefer to thediscussionin Appendix
B.
4.1 Framework for Model Construction (Step I)
As explained above, the first step in DFM is to construct a model of the embedded
system. This model is an integration of a "causality network", a "conditional network",
and a "time-transition network" which represent the functional behavior, the discontinuous
behavior, and the temporal behavior of the embedded system respectively. The building
blocks of these three networks are process variable nodes, transfer boxes, transition boxes,
causality edges, and conditioning edges, and they are shown in Figure 4.1. These
building blocks and the manner in which they are assembled to form the three networks
will be discussed in Section 4.1.1 and Section 4.1.2 below.
4.1.1 Building Blocks of DFM
4.1.1.1 Process Variable Nodes
The process variable nodes represent physical and software variables that are required to
capture the essential functional and/or discrete behavior of the embedded system. The
variable represented by a process variable node is discretized into a number of states. The
reason for discretization is to simplify the description of the relations between different
variables. The choice of the states for a process variable node is often dictated by the
logic of the system. For instance, it is natural to set a state boundary at a value that acts
as a trigger point for a switching action or a value which indicates the system is
progressing towards failure. The number of states for each variable must be chosen on
17
Process Variable Node
B Conditioning Parameter Node
r_r> Transfer Box
Transition Box
iiim.._ Causality Edge
Conditioning Edge
Figure 4.1 : Building Blocks of a DFM Model
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the basis of careful consideration to balance the accuracy of the model with the
complexity introduced by higher numbers of variable states.
4.1.1.2 Transfer Boxes
Transfer boxes link the process variable nodes together to represent relationships between
the variables described by these nodes. The way in which these variables vary with each
other are described by decision tables associated with a transfer box. The relationship
between the input and output process variable nodes is assumed to exist in the same time
frame.
A process variable node can be linked to a transfer box via a conditioning edge or a
causality edge. A conditioning edge is used when this variable is capable of triggering
different switching actions if it takes on different states. On the other hand, a causality
edge is used when the variable only exists within the causality flow of the system. The
conditioning edge and the causality edge are used to distinguish between functional and
discrete behavior found common in embedded systems. The discrete behavior can exist
in the form of switching paths in the software or component failures in the hardware.
4.1.1.2.1 Decision Tables
A decision table is used to represent the relationships between input and output process
variable nodes for a transfer box. This table is a mapping between the combinatorial
states of transfer box inputs to the outputs. Decision tables are an extension of truth
tables in that they allow each variable to be represented by any number of states.
Decision tables have been used to model components of engineering systems [Salem,
Apostolakis, Okrent, 1977]. A system can be modeled in terms of a network of
components. Each of these components is characterized by a decision table relating the
input states to the output states. This system model, which is made up of components,
provides a database for the automatic construction of fault trees. The fault tree
19
constructionis implementedby theCAT (ComputerAutomatedTree)Code[Salem,Wu,
and Apostolakis,1979].
In a decisiontable,therewill bea columnfor eachinput variableanda columnfor each
output variableof interest. The numberof rows in the tablewill equaltheproductof the
numberof statesinto which eachinput is discretized.
In the casewhen an input processvariable node is attachedto a transfer box via a
conditioning edge,more thanone decisiontablesarenecessaryto map the inputsto the
outputs. The number of decision tables is equal to the number of statesof this
conditioning input.
The informationcontainedin thedecisiontablesis usedin building fault treesduring the
Model Analysis Step(Step2). In backtrackingtheDFM model,certainstatesof a node
canbe foundto causethetopevents.Thedecisiontableassociatedwith this nodeis then
looked up to find the completeinput setsthatcould havecausedthoseparticularstates.
4.1.1.3 Transition Boxes
Transition boxes are similar to transfer boxes in connecting process variable nodes.
Conditioning edges and causality edges are again used to distinguish between discrete and
functional behavior. Decision tables are used to describe the relationship between the
input nodes and the output nodes. However, transition boxes differ from transfer boxes
in the essential aspect that a time lag or time transition is assumed to occur between the
time when the input variable states become true and the time when the output variable
state(s) associated with the inputs is(are) reached. This time delay is labeled with the
transition box.
Transition boxes are used to model portions of an embedded system where timing is
critical, such as the execution of software subroutines. In addition, transition boxes can
also be used to model hardware time transitions, such as relay actions, which are often
20
found in both embeddedsystemsandconventionalcontrol systems.
4.1.1.4 Causality Edges
As discussed in Section 4.1.1.2 above, causality edges are used to connect process
variable nodes and transfer boxes/transition boxes. The presence of causality edges
indicates a cause-and-effect relationship, such as proportional, or inversely proportional
between two process variable nodes.
4.1.1.5 Conditioning Edges
Unlike causality edges, conditioning edges are used to indicate discrete behavior in the
system. They link conditioning parameter nodes to transfer boxes, indicating the
possibility of selecting different decision tables in a transfer box. For example, depending
on certain software flag, the gains in a controller can be changed, thus altering the
functional relationship between the control inputs and control outputs.
4.1.2 Model Assembly
To develop a model for an embedded system, physical parameters and software variables
that capture the essential causal and temporal behavior of the system are first identified
as functional process variable nodes. These nodes are then linked together by transfer
boxes and transition boxes via causality edges to form an integrated "causality" and "time-
transition" network. Discrete behaviors such as component failures and logic switching
actions are then identified and represented as nodes linking to transfer/transition boxes via
conditioning edges. This "conditioning network" is then integrated to the "causality" and
"time-transition" network. The parameters represented by the process variable nodes are
discretized into meaningful states dictated by the logic of the system, such as the
possibility of triggering switching actions or leading to abnormal behavior. Decision
tables are constructed to relate these states together. The completed DFM model then
reflects the essential causal, temporal, and logic behavior of the embedded system. The
21
constructionof a DFM modelis going to be illustratedusingtheTitan II SLV DFCS in
Section 5.
22
5. Modeling the Titan II SLV DFCS with DFM
A DFM model is developed for the Titan II SLV DFCS for Stage I flight. In constructing
the DFM model, a number of simplifying assumptions are made.
1) The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) is assumed to be aligned properly prior to
liftoff so that the platform will not drift during flight.
2) Only the first and last Real-Time-Interrupts (RTI) within a 40 ms time period are
represented. This can be justified because readings from sensors and outputs to
actuators only occur during these two interrupts. The interrupts in between,
occurring every 5 ms, are dedicated to telemetry handling and are not relevant to
flight control.
3) The Major Cycle is represented as one big chunk of calculation at the end of the
1 s period, instead of using up little time-slots left over by the Minor Cycle
calculations. This can also be justified because the Minor Cycle calculations only
use the Major Cycle results after they are updated.
The hardware and software parameters essential for capturing the behavior of this
embedded system are listed in Table 5.1 and Table 5.11 respectively. For example, the
hardware parameters are identified by first recognizing the fact that the function of the
embedded system is to stabilize the vehicle during flight, hence, Bf, the body axes of the
vehicle (roll axis, pitch axis, and yaw axis) is an essential parameter. The body axes can
be varied by the deflection of the thrust chambers, so 0e, OR, 0v, the deflections of the
engines for pitch correction, roll correction, and yaw correction respectively are other
important parameters. The degree in body axes change is affected by the thrust F, the
mass M, the moment of inertia I, and the location of the center of mass CM, and these
parameters are added to the list. As the command to engines deflection comes from
measuring the gimbal angles tx, [3, 7, YR, the pitch rate PR, the yaw rate YR, and the
acceleration along the IMU axes a_m, a_m, a_m, these variables are also included in the list.
Finally, the IMU measures the gimbal angle by comparing the present body axes and the
body axes at go inertial Bi, so the variable B_ is also present in the list.
23
aunl
a
Bo
Bf
Bi
CM
F
I
M
PR
YR
O_
?R
0p
0a
0v
Acceleration along the accelerometer um-axis
Acceleratior, along the accelerometer vm-axis
Acceleration along the accelerometer wm-axis
Vector acceleration of the vehicle
Body axes of the vehicle at the beginning of a 40 msec cycle
Body axes of the vehicle at the end of a 40 msec cycle
Body axes of the vehicle at go inertial
Center of mass of the vehicle
Thrust
Moment of inertia about the center of mass
Mass of the vehicle
Pitch Rate
Yaw Rate
Platform gimbal angle
Middle gimbal angle
Outer redundant gimbal angle
Gamma gimbal angle
Angle of deflection of the engines for pitch correction
Angle of deflection of the engines for roll correction
Angle of deflection of the engines for yaw correction
Table 5.1 : Hardware Parameters of the Titan II DFM Model
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D2VUP
D2VVP
D2VWAP
D5NUC
D5NVC
D5NWC
D7VU
D7VV
D7VWA
D8UXL
D8UEL
H7CH8
H7CH9
H7CH10
H7CH11
H7CH12
H7CH13
H7CH16
I2CHER
R2OLER
Velocity Changein theLast 40 msecin LaunchCo-ordinates
Velocity Changein theLast 40 msecin LaunchCo-ordinates
Velocity Changein theLast 40 msecin LaunchCo-ordinates
Numberof AccelerometerCountsfor the uc Accelerometer
Numberof AccelerometerCountsfor thevc Accelerometer
Numberof AccelerometerCountsfor the wc Accelerometer
Velocity Changein theLast Secondin LaunchCo-ordinates
Velocity Changein theLast Secondin LaunchCo-ordinates
Velocity Changein theLast Secondin LaunchCo-ordinates
NumericalDerivativeof theCommandedRoll Axis inGimbalCo-ordinates
NumericalDerivativeof the CommandedPitch Axis in Gimbal
Co-ordinates
K sin( or-120°)
K sin( oc-60° )
K sin( [_-120° )
K sin( _-60° )
K sin(_/R-120°)
K sin( y_-60° )
InnerGammaResolverInput
Pitch Attitude Error
Roll Attitude Error
Table 5.1I: SoftwareParametersfor theTitan II Model (1/3)
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UET
UETC
UXI
UXIC
UZEI
U7EDM
U7XDM
U8ETA
U8XIA
VX
VY
VZ
W2DA 11
W2DA21
W2DA31
W2P
W2R
W2Y
W2PEI0
W2REI0
W2YEI0
GuidanceDesiredReferencePitch Axis in EarthCo-ordinates
GuidanceDesiredPitch Axis in Gimbal Co-ordinates
GuidanceDesiredRoll Axis in EarthCo-ordinates
DesiredRoll Axis in Gimbal Co-ordinates
DesiredYaw Axis at Initiation of StageI Pitchover
CommandedPitch Axis in Gimbal Co-ordinates
CommandedRoll Axis in Gimbal Co-ordinates
CommandedPitch Axis in Gimbal Co-ordinates
CommandedRoll Axis in Gimbal Co-ordinates
Vehicle Velocity in EarthCo-ordinates
Vehicle Velocity in EarthCo-ordinates
Vehicle Velocity in EarthCo-ordinates
D/A Output
D/A Output
D/A Output
ForwardLoop Pitch Signal
ForwardLoop Roll Signal
ForwardLoop Yaw Signal
Pitch Attitude Error Input Term
Roll Attitude Error Input Term
Yaw Attitude Error Input Term
Table 5.11: SoftwareParametersfor the Titan II Model (2/3)
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W2PE00
W2RE00
W2YE00
W2PLI0
W2YLI0
W7PIlL
W7YIIL
X
Y
Y2AWER
Y2DDB
Z
Z2DDB
LatestPitch AttitudeError OutputTerm
LatestRoll Attitude Error OutputTerm
LatestYaw Attitude Error OutputTerm
PitchLateral AccelerationInputTerm
Yaw LateralAccelerationInput Term
Pitch Rate1 Gyro Input
Yaw Rate1 Gyro Input
Vehicle Positionin EarthCo-ordinates
VehiclePositionin EarthCo-ordinates
Yaw Attitude Error
Yaw PlaneLateralAcceleration
Vehicle Positionin EarthCo-ordinates
Pitch PlaneLateralAcceleration
Table 5.11: SoftwareParametersfor the Titan II Model (3/3)
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The DFM modelof the embeddedsystemis shownin Figure5.1. Due to thelimitation
in space,the representationof theflight control softwareis expandedin all the detail in
Figure 5.2.
In Figure 5.1, transferbox A modelstheIMU, whereB_andBf are compared to generate
the gimbal angle measurements or, 13, y, and YR. Transfer box D represents the gyros
which measure the pitch rate PR and yaw rate YR, while transfer box F shows the
accelerometers which provide measurements a_m, a_m, a_,,. The sensor inputs or, [3, T, YR,
PR, YR, a_m, a_,,, and a_m are used by the flight control software to calculate the thruster
deflections 0p, 0k, and 0v. Finally, transfer box C represents the rocket itself in which
the body axes and the current acceleration depends on F, M, I, CM, 0p, 0 R, and 0v.
Figure 5.2 is constructed based on the control flow in the flight control software. The
transition boxes represent software modules, and the nodes represent essential parameters
in the software code. For example, RTI-0 is the software module for the first Real-Time-
Interrupt. This module reads in the gimbal angle measurements tx, 13, 7, and YR, and
represents them as the variables H7CH8, H7CH9, H7CH 10, H7CH 11, H7CH 12, H7CH 13,
and H7CH16. Similarly, the measurements a_m, a_m, and awm are read in as accelerometer
counts and are represented as D5NUC, D5NVC, and D5NWC. Finally, the pitch rate and
yaw rate are represented as W7PIIL, and W7YIIL. This figure shows that the sensor
measurements are read in by RTI-0. The accelerometer counts are first converted to
accelerations by the software module BLOCK 51. The next subroutine executed, BLOCK
50, uses the gimbal angle measurements to determine the lateral acceleration of the
vehicle and its current body axes. Next, the desirable body axes, which is updated every
second in the major cycle, is compared with the current axes to find the attitude errors.
The final outputs produced by BLOCK 50 are the attitude errors (roll error, pitch error,
and yaw error), and the lateral accelerations (pitch acceleration and yaw acceleration).
These variables, together with the pitch rate and yaw rate information, are used by the
subroutine FIG 10 to calculate the flight control inputs. These inputs are used in the
module FIG 11 to calculate the forward loop signals. The control equations implemented
in FIG 11 are 4th order equations, so previous flight control inputs are read in and
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Figure 5.1 ' DFM Model of the Titan II Flight Control System
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Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2 • DFM Model of the Flight Control Software (3/3)
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updated. The forward loop signals are then converted to D/A outputs in the subroutine
FIG 33. The software then waits until the RTI-7 executes to issue the outputs to the
actuators. This completes one minor cycle. After executing 25 similar cycles, the time
between the completion of FIG 33 and the execution of RTI-7 will be used for major
calculations, hence the branching after FIG 33.
Note that most of the process parameter nodes are linked to transfer/transition boxes via
causality edges. A conditioning edge links the node N8L to the transition box BLOCK
4. N8L is the time kept by the software, and the variable dictates the type of maneuvers
to be executed. The execution of different maneuvers causes a discrete jump in the
software in the form of using different equations to calculate the desirable body axes.
After linking up the parameters by the transfer boxes and transition boxes, the next step
is to construct decision tables to represent the relationships between the parameters.
Combinatorial explosion is encountered in the construction of decision tables for the
software subroutines. One of the subroutines will be used to illustrate the problem. In
the subroutine BLOCK 1, the variables X, Y, Z, VX, VY, VZ, D7VU, D7VV, and
D7VWA are used to calculate new values for X, Y, Z, VX, VY, and VZ for the next
second. The variables (X,Y,Z) represent the location of the rocket, (VX,VY,VZ)
represent the velocity of the rocket, and (D7VU,D7VV,D7VWA) represents the
acceleration of the rocket due to thrust alone. X, Y, and Z are each discretized into 5
states, representing a large negative deviation, a moderate deviation, a distance close to
0, a moderate positive deviation, and a large positive deviation. VX, VY, and VZ are
also each discretized into 5 states representing a large negative velocity, a moderate
velocity, a velocity close to 0, a moderate positive velocity, and a large positive velocity.
Similarly, D7VU, D7VV, and D7VWA are each discretized into 5 states representing a
large negative acceleration, a moderate negative acceleration, an acceleration close to 0,
a moderate positive acceleration, and a large positive acceleration.
The equations implemented by this software module are listed in Table 5.III.
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,2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
DVW
FI31
FI32
FI33
RG11
RG21
RG31
RG12
RG22
RG32
RG13
RG23
RG33
DVSX
DVSY
DVSZ
DVSQ
X
Y
Z
,m
CG22*FI13 +
CG23*FI13 +
CG21*FI11 +
CG22*FI11 +
CG23*FI11 +
RG2 l*RG32 -
RG31 *RG 12 -
D7VWA
FI12*FI23 - FI13*FI22
FI13*FI21 - FI11"FI23
FI11"FI22 - FI12*FI21
CG21*FI13 + CG31*FI23 + CG11"FI33
CG32*FI23 + CG12*FI33
CG33*FI23 + CG13*FI33
CG31*FI21 + CG1 l*FI31
CG32*FI21 + CG12*FI31
CG33*FI21 + CG13*FI31
RG3 l*RG22
RG 11 *RG32
RG1 l*RG22 - RG21*RG12
RG12*D7VU + RG13*D7VV + RG11*DVW
RG22*D7VU + RG23*D7VV + RG21*DVW
RG32*D7VU + RG33*D7VV + RG31*DVW
DVSX*DVSX + DVSY+DVSY + DVSZ*DVSZ
X + VX + 1/2 * (DVSX + DVGX)
Y + VY + 1/2 * (DVSY + DVGY)
Z + VZ + 1/2 * (DVSZ + DVGZ)
Table 5.III • The Subroutine BLOCK 1 (1/2)
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21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
RSQ
R
U
UX
UY
UZ
AG
DVGJ
DVGZE
RE1
RE2
RE3
DVGX
DVGY
DVGZ
VX
VY
VZ
= X*X + Y*Y + Z*Z
= SQRT(RSQ)
= 1/R
= U*X
= U*Y
= U*Z
= CGMN*U*U
= AG*CJG5*AG
= AG + DVGJ + AG*UZ*CJAG*AG*UZ
= DVGX
= DVGY
= DVGZ
= DVGZE*UX
= DVGZE*UY
= (DVGJ + DVGJ + DVGZE)*UZ
= VX + DVSX + 1/2 * (DVGX + RE1)
= VY + DVSY + 1/2 * (DVGY + RE2)
= VZ + DVSZ + 1/2 * (DVGZ + RE3)
Table5.Ill • The SubroutineBLOCK 1 (2/2)
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Equation1calculatestheaccelerationaftercompensationfor the drift of theIMU. Since
we assumeno drift, the two accelerationsareequal. As D7VU, D7VV, andDVW are
not in the sameco-ordinate systemas X, Y, Z, VX, VY, and VZ, equations2-16
transform the accelerationsinto the sameco-ordinatesystemand representthem as
DVSX, DVSY, andDVSZ. Equation17doesnothingmorethancalculatingthe square
of the magnitudeof theacceleration.Equation18-20updatethe positionX, Y, Z using
the velocities VX, VY, and VZ, and the accelerationsDVSX, DVSY, DVSZ, DVGX,
DVGY, andDVGZ. The DVS's areaccelerationsdueto thrustalone,while the DVG's
are accelerationsdue to gravitationalpull. The total accelerationis a sum of the two.
Equations21-35 updatethe accelerationsdue to gravitationalpull basedon the current
position X, Y, and Z. Theseequationsalso storesthe previousaccelerationsdue to
gravity as RE1, RE2, and RE3. Finally, equations36-38 updatethe velocitiesof the
vehicle using the accelerationsdue to thrust and the accelerationsdueto gravity. The
latter is calculatedasan averageof thecurrentandthepreviousvalue.
To completethe entriesin the decisiontable,we needto samplecombinationsof these
9 input variables. In our model,all these9 input variablesareeachdiscretizedinto 5
different states. This meansthat we haveto sampleat least59 times. Hence,we are
running into the combinatorialproblemencounteredin moduletesting. In addition,the
decision table producedwill be huge, consistingof 59 rows. It will be very time
consumingto look upmanytablesof this sizeduring themodelanalysisstep. A possible
solution to this problemis suggestedin thenext section.
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6. A Solution to the Problem of Combinatorial Explosion
The approach to solving the combinatorial explosion problem in the decision table
construction is based on the intention to bypass the construction step. It can be observed
that the decision tables constructed in Step 1 are only used for providing information for
Step 2 (Model Analysis). In the analysis, the causality and the temporal flow of the DFM
model is backtracked to identify causes for certain top-events. The decision tables
provide intermediate information on the backtracking step, namely in finding the
parameter states in-between the top events and their causes. If we are able to find these
intermediate causes by some means other than looking up the decision tables, we can
avoid the combinatorial explosion problem altogether.
For the Titan II flight control software, its subroutines implement equations with distinct
physical meaning. The equations either represent equations of motion or control laws.
Hence, we can take advantage of this fact and try to solve the equations implemented in
the subroutines in reverse, instead of constructing and later looking up the decision tables
in the backtracking process.
The approach presented here intends to solve the intermediate causes on-line during the
analysis. For instance, a particular subroutine is encountered in backtracking the DFM
model and certain outputs from this subroutine are found to eventually produce the top
event. The next step is to find the combinations of inputs that produce those outputs via
this particular subroutine. Instead of looking up the decision tables constructed previously
for this subroutine in Step 1, we can try to solve the equations implemented in the
subroutine.
For example, the analysts are interested in finding out why the thrust chambers have
deflected 2 °, 2.5 °, and 1.5 ° respectively for roll correction, pitch correction, and yaw
correction. This condition, whose causes are to be found, is represented as the top event
in the fault tree shown in Figure 6.1. In the DFM model in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2,
we find that the condition (0p, OR, 0v) = (2 °, 2.5 °, 1.5 °) is backtracked through the transfer
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Op =2 ° OR =2.5 ° ey = 1.5 °
W2DA11=52
[
W2DA21 = 65
1
W2DA31 =39]
-<_
I t
W2P = 51.7 W2R = -12.8 W2Y = 51.8
Figure 6.1 • Fault Tree for ( 0r, OR, 0y ) = (2 °, 2.5 °, 1.5 °)
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box B. This condition is found to be causedby W2DA11 = 52, W2DA21 = 65, and
W2DA31 = 39. Next, we backtrackthe delaytime transitionwhich waits for RTI-7 to
execute. The parametersW2DAll, W2DA21, and W2DA31 retain their values.
Continuing the backtrackingprocess,the DFM model showsthat W2DA11, W2DA21,
and W2DA31 arecalculatedby the subroutineFIG 33 with the input variablesW2P,
W2R, andW2Y. We needto find whatvaluesof theseinput variablesproducetheoutput
values of interest in order to enter the gate in the next level in the fault tree. The
equationsimplementedin this softwaremoduleFIG 33 aresolved,and the input values
are found to beW2P = 51.7,W2R= -12.8,andW2Y = 51.8. This information is, then,
enteredinto the fault tree. The backtrackingprocessis continuedand the equation
solving procedureis repeated,if necessary,for the next subroutine. The approachfor
solving the equationsis basedon the Newton-Raphsonmethodfor solving a systemof
non-linearequations.An overviewof theNewton-Raphsonmethodin providedin Section
6.1,andthediscussionof theproposedapproachispresentedin Section6.2. An example
to demonstratethis approachis providedin Section6.3.
6.1 The Newton-Raphson Method
The Newton-Raphson Method [Johnson and Riess, 1982], [Maron, 1987], [Fr6berg, 1985]
is a well-known approach in numerical analysis for solving a system of non-linear
equations. The Newton-Raphson Method can be classified as a fixed-point iteration in
which successive guesses are calculated based on previous results to approximate the
exact solution. The iteration procedure is terminated when the error becomes less than
the predetermined tolerance. The convergence of this solution method is second order,
which means that the error in the current iteration is proportional to the square of the
error in the previous iteration.
Given a system of n functions
F(x) = (fl(x), f2(x) ..... f,(x) )r
where x = ( x l, x2, ..., xn ),
the Newton-Raphson Method helps us to find the exact solution a where F(a) = 0. The
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Newton-RaphsonMethod provides a formula for making successiveiteration. This
formula is
Xk+ ! ---_
Xk+ 1 "-
X k ---_
J(Xk) "1 =
J =
Xk - J(Xk) -I F(Xk), where
(k+ 1)th iteration
k t_ iteration
inverse of the Jacobian Matrix calculated using the k th iteration
Jacobian Matrix in which the element in the ith row and jth column is
defined as dfi/dx j
Note that in the iteration, we need to supply an initial guess. This initial guess is crucial
to the convergence. If this guess is sufficiently close to the exact solution, the iteration
converges rapidly towards the exact solution. On the other hand, if the initial guess is
bad, the iteration diverges rapidly. Divergence can also occur if there is no solution to
the particular system of equations.
6.2 Solution Solving Approach
The proposed approach is based on solving the equations implemented by a subroutine
in reverse during the backtracking analysis. Owing to the fact that the number of
unknowns does not necessarily equal the number of equations, the Newton-Raphson
Method cannot be applied directly. It has to be adapted to handle the situations in which
the number of unknowns is equal to, less than, and greater than the number of equations.
These three situations will each be discussed below.
It should be observed that while solving the equations, the analyst must be aware of the
switching actions that may exist in the subroutine. This information is identified in Step
1 and is represented in the DFM model as a process variable node linking to the relevant
transition box via a conditioning edge. If switching actions arises, the appropriate
equations, i.e., the equations relevant to the range of the current iteration, have to be
solved.
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Supposea subroutineconsistsof n input variablesx_,x2..... x, and m output variables Yt,
Y2..... Ym" The physical equations implemented by this subroutine are:
Yl = gl( xl, x2..... Xn )
Y2 = g2( Xl, X2..... Xn )
Ym = gin( Xl, X2..... Xn )
In the backtracking analysis, we discover that the outputs y_ = b_, Y2 = b2 ..... Ym = bm
from this subroutine will eventually lead to the top event. The next step is to find out
the combinations of input values which produce this set of output values.
We first express the information in terms of m functions:
fl( xl ..... Xn) =
f2(x_ ..... X.) =
gl( Xl ..... x. ) - bl
g2( x l, "", x. ) - b 2
fro( Xl ..... Xn ) = gin( xl ..... x. ) - b m
The objective is then to determine the values a t, a2..... an such that
fl( al, a2, ..., an ) = 0
f2( aj, a2..... a, ) = 0
fro( al, a2, ..., am ) = 0
However, the Newton-Raphson Method cannot be applied directly as n does not
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necessarilyequalm. Threedifferent situationsmay arisewhenm = n, m > n, and m <
n.
Case 1 m = n
The Newton-Raphson Method can be applied directly. As explained previously, solutions
can be found by using a "good" initial guess for the solution. However, if diverging
iterations are produced with this method, it is possible that no solution exist or the initial
guess is too far from the exact solution. Further investigations have to be performed to
identify which is really the situation encountered.
Case 2 m > n
In this case, the output variables y_, Y2..... Ym are not independent. We can choose
amongst them the n independent variables. Without loss of generality, let these be Yl, Y2,
•.-, Yn. We can then solve the system
fl = 0
f_ = 0
using Newton-Raphson Method, where
fi( XI' X2 ..... Xn ) = gi( Xl' X2 .... ' x, ) - bi
i=1,2 ..... n
The observation regarding diverging iterations also applies in this situation.
Case 3 m < n
The most interesting case occur when m < n. The approach is to assume arbitrary values
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for (n-m) of the variablesandthensolvefor theremainingm variables. We then repeat
this processwith anothersetof arbitraryvaluesfor the(n-m) variables.
Supposewe have the subroutinewith inputs xI..... Xn,and outputsy_..... Ym,and the
subroutineimplementstheequations
Yl = gl( xl..... xn)
Ym = gm(Xl..... Xn)
Without lossof generality,we first assumearbitraryvaluesfor the last (n-m) variables:
Xm+ 1 _ km+ I
Xn = lq
We then solve the system
f_ = 0 i=1,2 ..... m
using the Newton-Raphson Method, where
fi( Xl ..... Xm ) = gi( xl ..... Xm, km÷l..... 1% ) - b i
i=1,2 ..... m
The detailed procedure for implementing this approach will be demonstrated in Section
6.3.
In case a solution does not exist for the assumed arbitrary values
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Xm+ I = km+ I
X. = kn
the iterations produced in the Newton-Raphson Method will diverge no matter what the
initial guesses are.
6.3 Example
We will demonstrate this approach using the subroutine BLOCK 1 in the Titan II flight
control software. This subroutine is chosen because the problem of combinatorial
explosion is encountered in constructing its associated decision table, and the equations
implemented in this software module have been discussed in Section 5. We will see how
solving the equations in the software can take the place of looking up big, previously
constructed decision tables in the backtracking analysis. This approach is implemented
by a software code written in C, and is found to be successful.
The subroutine BLOCK 1 has been presented in Section 5. This subroutine updates the
position and velocity of the rocket by using the previous known position and velocity, and
the current acceleration of the rocket. The input variables are X, Y, Z, VX, VY, VZ,
D7VU, D7VV, and D7VWA. The output variables are X, Y, Z, VX, VY, and VZ.
Suppose in our backtracking analysis, we find that the outputs
X = 1.001 x 107
Y = 1.001 X 10 7
Z = 2.002 X 10 7
VX = -9990
VY = 9990
VZ = 19980
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will eventually producedthe top event. This information is found by backtrackingthe
DFM model asseenin Section6.1. We needto find theinputsin order to go down the
next level in the fault tree.
As n-m = 3, we first needto assumearbitrary valuesfor threeof the input variables.
Thesearechosento be D7VU, D7VV, and D7VWA. The arbitraryvaluesare:
D7VU = -100 or 100
D7VV = -100or 100
D7VWA= -100 or 100
The C programtriesthe eight possiblecombinationsof D7VU, D7VV, andD7VWA to
solvefor X, Y, Z, VX, VY, VZ. The codewritten to implementtheapproachis shown
in Figure 6.2. It usesthe initial guesses
XO=l.O01x 10 7
Y0= 1.001 x 107
Z0=2.002 x 10 7
VX0=--9990
VY0=9990
VZ0= 19980
and the results are shown in Figure 6.3. It can be seen that convergence is attained in
only two iterations! This is due to the fact that the initial guesses are very close to the
exact solution. As a comparison, the program is executed using another set of initial
guesses.
X0=-2.1 x 107
Y0=0
Z0=0
VXO=0
VYO=-0
VZ0=0
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Theresultsproducedareshownin Figure6.4. This time, convergenceis attainedin three
iterations,which is still very fast indeed.
The results showsthat solving the equationsimplementedin the softwareis a feasible
approach to replace the need to construct and look up the decision tables in the
backtrackinganalysis. As seenin Section5, combinatorialexplosionin samplingcanbe
encounteredduring the decisiontable constructionstep. It shouldbe observedthat the
particular subroutine to be solved and the associatedvalues are indicated by the
backtracking of the DFM model. The equationsimplementedin that subroutineare
solvedto completethe entriesnext level downin thefault tree.
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#include<stdio.h>
#include<math.h>
#defineMAXITERATION (1000)
#defineTOLERANCE (1E-03)
#defineCGMN (-0.14076458E+17)
#defineCJAG (0.25258642E-03)
#defineCJG5 (-0.50517284E-04)
*/
*/
*/
*/
#define NUMBER_IN (9)
#define NUMBER_OUT (6)
#define NUMBER_SAM (3)
#define SAMPLE_POINT (5)
#define h (1)
/* Number of input variables */
/* Number of output variables */
/* Number of input variables to be sampled */
/* Maximum number of sampling points */
/* The step use to calculate Jacobian Matrix */
void sample(int,int*,int*,double[NUMBER_SAM][SAMPLE_POINT],
double*,double* );
int newton( double*, double* );
void fn( double*, double*, double* );
void jm( double jf[NUMBER_OUT][NUMBER_OUT],
double*, double* );
void check( double* );
Figure 6.2 • Software Code for Solving Equations (1/14)
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/* main.c
/* Solving for the input variables for BLOCK 1
/* with a checking algorithm
/* Michael Yau 4-12-1993
]4 444_4444444_4444444_44_c4444444444444_c_4444
#include "e:\bccknewton_header.h"
main()
{
int i, j, count[NUMBER_SAM];
int sam_pnt[NUMBER_SAM];
double x[NUMBER_IN], y[NUMBER_OUT];
double temp, s[NUMBER_IN][SAMPLE_POINT];
FILE *sample_in, *data_in;
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
*/
/* Keep track of the input and output variables */
/* */
/* x[0] = x0 y[0] = xl */
/* x[1] = y0 y[1] = yl */
/* x[2] = z0 y[2] = zl */
/* x[3] = vx0 y[3] = vxl */
/* x[4] = vy0 y[4] = vyl */
/* x[5] = vz0 y[5] = vzl */
/* x[6] = d7vu s[0] = d7vu */
/* x[7] = d7vv s[1] = d7vv */
/* x[8] = d7vwz s[2] = d7vwz */
/. */
[4 444444444444_c4444444_4_c4444444_444_44444444_4 4[
/* Get the values of the output variables from input.dat */
data_in = fopen("input.dat","r");
/* Get the values in the order x 1,y 1,z 1,vx 1,vy 1,vz 1 */
while (fscanf(data_in,"%lf",&y[0]) == 1 ){
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for ( i = 1; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++ ){
fscanf(data_in,"%lf",&temp);
y[i] = temp;
}
printfC_**************************************Ln_");
printff"For the output variables:_");
for ( i = 0; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++ ){
printff"y[%2d] - %10.3e_",i,y[i]);
J
/* Read in the sampling points */
sample_in = fopen("sampnt.dat","r");
for ( i = 0; i < NUMBER_SAM; i++ ){
fscanf(sample_in,"%d",&sam_pnt[i]);
for ( j = 0; j < sam_pnt[i]; j++ ){
fscanf(sample_in,"%lf",&temp);
s[i][j] = temp;
}
}
fclose(sample_in);
/* Start sampling */
sample( 0, count, sam_pnt, s, x, y );
}
fclose(data_in);
return NULL;
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#include "e:\bcc_ewtonkheader.h"
void sample(intlevel,int count[NUMBER_SAM],intsam_pnt[NUMBER_SAM],
double s[NUMBER_SAM][SAMPLE_POINT],
doublex[NUMBER_IN], doubley[NUMBER_OUT])
{
int i, j, newton_return;
for ( count[level]=0; count[level]<sam_pnt[level]; count[level]++ ){
if ( level < NUMBER_SAM-1 )
sample( level+l, count, sam_pnt, s, x, y );
else
printf("_*****************************Xn");
printf("_ For the sample points:Xn_a");
for ( i = NUMBER_OUT; i < NUMBER_IN; i++ ){
j = count[i-NUMBER_OUT];
x[i] = s[i-NUMBER_OUT] [j];
printf(" x[%2d] = % 10.3e_,,i,x[i]);
}
newton_return = newton( x, y );
if ( newton_return == 0 )
{
printf("XnLn
pointsXn");
}
else
{
No solution for this set of sample
printf("_Xn The solution is:XnXn");
for( i = 0; i < NUMBER_IN; i++ ){
printf(" x[%2d] = %10.3eXn",i,x[i]);
}
check( x );
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/. **************************
/* newton.c
/* Michael Yau 4-12-1993
*/
*/
*/
*/
#include "e:\bccknewtonkheader.h"
/* *** Subroutine to implement Newton's Method *** */
int newton( double*x, double*y )
{
double f/NUMBER_OUT/, jf[NUMBER_OUT][NUMBER_OUT];
double dx[NUMBER_OUT], m[NUMBER_OUT][NUMBER_OUT];
double previous_error, error, ftemp, jftemp, jfmax;
int count, i, j, k, 1, imax;
double find_error( double* );
/* ****************_************* */
/* initi_ize the solution vector */
/, ****************************** */
x[0] = -2.1e+07;
x/l/= 0;
x[2] = 0;
x[3] = 0;
x[4] = 0;
x[5] = 0;
printf("kn%4s %9s %9s %9s %9s %9s %9s %9s_n",
"N","x0","y0","z0","vx0","vy0","vz0","Error");
/* Start iteration */
for ( count = 0; count < MAXITERATION; count++ ){
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/* Print out the guess */
printf("_a%4d",count);
for ( i = 0; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++ ){
printf(" %9.2e",x[i]);
}
/* Evaluate f and reverse the sign */
fn( f, x, y );
/* Find the error */
error = find_error( f );
printf(" %9.2e",error);
if ( error < TOLERANCE )
return 1;
if ( count > 0 )
if ( error > previous_error )
return 0;
previous_error = error;
/* Calculate the Jacobian Matrix */
jm( jf, x, y );
/* Calculate the inverse of the Jacobian Matrix */
for( k = 0; k < NUMBER_OUT; k++){
/* Row Interchange */
imax = k;
jfmax = fabs(jf[k][k]);
for( 1 = k+l; 1 < NUMBER_OUT; 1++){
if (fabs(jf[1][k]) > jfmax )
I
jfmax = fabs(jf[l][k]);
imax = 1;
}
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if(imax !=k)
{
for( 1 = k; 1 < NUMBER_OUT; 1++){
jftemp = jf[k][1];
jf[k][l] = jf[imax][l];
jf[imax][l] = jftemp;
}
ftemp = f[k];
f[k] = f[imax];
f[imax] - ftemp;
}
/* Forward Elimination */
for( i = k+l; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++){
m[i][k] = jf[i][k] / jf[k][k];
f[i] -= m[i][k] * f[k];
for( j = k+l; j < NUMBER_OUT; j++){
jf[i][j] -= m[i][k] * jf[k][j];
J
/* Back Substitution */
dx[NUMBER_OUT- 1] = f[NUMBER_OUT- 1] /
j f[NUMB ER_OUT- 11 [NUMBER_OUT- 1];
for( i = NUMBER_OUT-2; i >= 0; i-){
dx[i] = 0.0;
for( j = i+l; j < NUMBER_OUT; j++){
dx[i] += jf[i][j] * dx[j];
)
dx[i] = ( f[i] - dx[i] ) /jf[i][i];
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/* Calculate the next guesses */
for ( i = 0; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++ ){
x[i] += dx[i];
}
}
return 1 ;
/* *** End of Subroutine newton *** */
/* *** Subroutine to find the error *** */
double find_error( double* f )
{
double error=0;
int i;
for ( i = 0; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++ ){
error += f[i]*f[i];
}
return sqrt(error);
/* *** End of Subroutine find_error *** */
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/* *********************************************** _/
/* function.c */
/* This file contains the function definitions for */
/* the subroutine */
/* Michael Yau 4-12-1993 */
#include "e:\bcc_ewtonkheader.h"
/* *** Subroutine to evaluate the function *** */
void fn( double* f, double* x, double* y )
{
int i;
double
double
double
double
double
double
CG11, CG12, CG13, CG21, CG22, CG23, CG31, CG32, CG33;
D7VU, D7VV, D7VWA, DVW, DVSQ;
X, Y, Z, VX, VY, VZ, DVSX, DVSY, DVSZ;
DVGX, DVGY, DVGZ, RE1, RE2, RE3;
Fill, FI12, FI13, FI21, FI22, FI23, FI31, FI32, FI33;
RGll, RG12, RG13, RG21, RG22, RG23, RG31, RG32, RG33;
double p[3];
void dvg( double*, double*, double*, double* );
X
Y
Z
VX
VY
VZ
D7VU
D7VV
D7VWA
FIll = 1;
FI12 = 0;
FI13 = 0;
FI21 = 0;
FI22 = 1;
FI23 = 0;
= x[0];
= x/l/;
= x[2];
= x[3];
= x[4];
= x[5l;
= x[6];
= x[7];
= x[8];
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CG11 = 0.14379912;
CG12 = -0.86644896;
CG13= 0.47810879;
CG21= 0.09714823;
CG22= 0.49315612;
CG23= 0.86449942;
CG31= -0.98482691;
CG32= -0.07786683;
CG33= 0.15508940;
DVW = D7VWA;
FI31 = FI12*FI23 - FI22*FI13;
FI32 = FI13*FI21 - FI23*FI11;
FI33 = FI11"FI22 - FI21*FI12;
RGll = CG21*FI13+ CG31*FI23+ CGIl*FI33;
RG21= CG22*FI13+ CG32*FI23 + CG12*FI33;
RG31= CG23*FI13 + CG33*FI23+ CG13*FI33;
RG12= CG21*FI11 + CG31*FI21+ CGll*FI31;
RG22= CG22*FI11 + CG32*FI21+ CG12*FI31;
RG32= CG23*FI11 + CG33*FI21+ CG13*FI31;
RG13= RG21*RG32- RG22*RG31;
RG23= RG31*RG12- RG32*RGll;
RG33= RG1l*RG22 - RG12*RG21;
DVSX = RG12*D7VU + RG13*D7VV + RG11*DVW;
DVSY = RG22*D7VU + RG23*D7VV + RG21*DVW;
DVSZ = RG32*D7VU + RG33*D7VV + RG31*DVW;
DVSQ = DVSX*DVSX + DVSY*DVSY + DVSZ*DVSZ;
p[0] = X;
p[l] = Y;
p[2] = Z;
dvg( &DVGX, &DVGY, &DVGZ, p );
X = X + VX + 0.5*( DVSX + DVGX );
Y = Y + VY + 0.5*( DVSY + DVGY );
Z = Z + VZ + 0.5*( DVSZ + DVGZ );
RE1 = DVGX;
RE2 = DVGY;
RE3 = DVGZ;
p[0] = X;
p[1] = Y;
p[2] = Z;
dvg( &DVGX, &DVGY, &DVGZ, p );
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VX =
VY =
VZ =
f[0] =
f[1] =
f[2] =
f[31 =
f[4] =
f[5] =
for(i
VX + DVSX + 0.5*( DVGX + RE1 );
VY + DVSY + 0.5*( DVGY + RE2 );
VZ + DVSZ + 0.5*( DVGZ + RE3 );
x - y[0];
Y- y[ll;
Z- y[21;
VX - y[3];
VY- y[4];
vz- y[5];
= 0; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++ ){
f[i] = -f[i];
/* *** End of Subroutine fn *** */
/* *** Subroutine to find dvgx, dvgy, and dvgz *** */
void dvg( double *dvgx, double *dvgy, double *dvgz,
double p[3] )
{
double r, ux, uy, uz, ag, dvgj, dvgze;
r = sqrt( (p[0l*p[0l + p[ll*p[l] + p[2]*p[2]) );
ux = p[0l/r;
uy = p[1]/r;
uz = p[2]/r;
ag = CGMN / (r'r);
dvgj = ag * CJG5 * ag;
dvgze = ag + dvgj + ag*uz*CJAG*uz*ag;
• dvgx = dvgze * ux;
• dvgy = dvgze * uy;
• dvgz = ( 2*dvgj + dvgze ) * uz;
/* *** End of Subroutine dvg *** */
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/* *** Subroutine to find the Jacobian Matrix *** */
void jm( double jf[NUMBER_OUT][NUMBER_OUT], double* x, double* y )
{
double f_plus[NUMBER_OUT], f_minus[NUMBER_OUT];
double x_plus[NUMBER_IN], x_minus[NUMBER_IN];
int i, j;
for ( i = 0; i < NUMBER_OUT; i++ ){
for ( j = 0; j < NUMBER_IN; j++ ){
if(j ==i)
{
}
else
{
}
}
x_plus[j] = x[j] + h;
x_minus[j] = x[j] - h;
x_plus[j] = x[j];
x_minus[j] = x[j];
fn( f_plus , x_plus , y );
fn( f_minus, x_minus, y );
for ( j = 0; j < NUMBER_OUT; j++ ){
jf[j][i] = ( f_minus[j]-f_plus[j] ) / (2*h);
}
}
}
/* *** End of Subroutine jm *** */
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#include "e:\bcchaewton_header.h"
/* *** Subroutine to check the solution *** */
void check( double*x )
double z[NUMBER_OUT];
double dvgx0, dvgy0, dvgz0, dvgxl, dvgyl, dvgzl;
double CG11, CG12, CG13, CG21, CG22, CG23;
double RG11, RG12, RG13, RG21, RG22, RG23;
double RG31, RG32, RG33;
double DVSX, DVSY, DVSZ;
void dvg( double*, double*, double*, double* );
CGll = 0.14379912;
CG12 = -0.86644896;
CG13 = 0.47810879;
CG21 = 0.09714823;
CG22 = 0.49315612;
CG23 = 0.86449942;
RGll =CGll;
RG21 = CG12;
RG31 = CG13;
RG12 = CG21;
RG22 = CG22;
RG32 = CG23;
RG13 = RG21*RG32 - RG22*RG31;
RG23 = RG31*RG12 - RG32*RG11;
RG33 = RG1 l*RG22 - RG12*RG21;
DVSX = RG12*x[6] + RG13*x[7] + RG1 l'x[8];
DVSY = RG22*x[6] + RG23*x[7] + RG21*x[8];
DVSZ = RG32*x[6] + RG33*x[7] + RG31*x[8];
dvg( &dvgx0, &dvgy0, &dvgz0, x );
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z[0] = x[0] + x[3] + 0.5*( DVSX + dvgx0 );
z[1]=x[1]+x[4]+ 5*(DVSY+dvgy0);
z[2] = x[2] + x[5] + 0.5*( DVSZ + dvgz0);
dvg( &dvgxl, &dvgyl, &dvgzl, z );
z[3] = x[3] + DVSX + 0.5*( dvgx0 + dvgxl );
z[4] = x[4] + DVSY + 0.5*( dvgy0 + dvgyl );
z[5] = x[5] + DVSZ + 0.5*( dvgz0 + dvgzl );
/* Print out the result of checking */
printf('%a Result of Checking:kn");
printf("kn xl = %10.3e yl = %10.3e zl =
printf("kn vxl = %10.3e vyl = %10.3e
% 10.3ekn",z[3],z[4],z[5]);
/* *** End of Subroutine check *** */
% 10.3e",z[0],z[ 1],z [2]);
vzl -
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For theoutput variables:
y[ 0] = 1.001e+07
y[ 1] = 1.001e+07
y[ 2] = 2.002e+07
y[ 3] = -9.990e+03
y[ 4] = 9.990e+03
y[ 5] = 1.998e+04
For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X = 1.00e+07Y= 1.00e+07Z= 2.00e+07
VX = -9.90e+03VY= 9.90e+03VZ= 2.00e+04
Error = 2.43e+04
X = 1.00e+07Y= 1.00e+O7Z= 2.00e+07
VX = -9.88e+03VY= 1.01e+04VZ= 2.01e+04
Error = 2.61e-05
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] = 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Resultof Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07yl = 1.001e+07zl = 2.002e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03vyl = 9.990e+03vzl = 1.998e+04
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For the sample points:
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.O00e+02
Iteration
0 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.90e+03
Error = 2.44e+04
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.88e+03
Error = 2.59e-05
VY =
1.00e+07
9.90e+03
1.00e+07
1.01e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ -- 2.00e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
r'; 1] = l.O00e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] = 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03 vyl = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] -- -1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.90e+03
Error = 2.44e+04
y ,_.
VY =
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.88e+03
Error = 2.60e-05
1.00e+07
9.90e+03
1.00e+07
9.90e+03
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.00e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ I] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 51 = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07 zl = 2.002e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03 vyl = 9.990e+03 vzl = 1.998e+04
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For the sample points:
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
I_r_ion
0 X = 1.OOe+07
VX = -9.90e+03
Error = 2.45e+04
Y -- 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.88e+03
Error = 2.57e-05
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.00e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl -1.001e+07 zl = 2.002e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03 vyl = 9.990e+03 vzl = 1.998e+04
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.90e+03
Error = 2.43e+04
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 2.61e-05
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.00e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] =-1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vx 1 = -9.990e+03 vy 1 = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 81= 1.O00e+02
I_rafion
0 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.90e+03
Error = 2.44e+04
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 2.58e-05
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.00e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07 zl = 2.002e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03 vyl = 9.990e+03 vzl = 1.998e+04
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.90e+03
Error = 2.43e+04
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 2.59e-05
Y = 1.00e+07 Z =
VY = 9.90e+03 VZ =
Y = 1.00e+07 Z =
VY = 9.90e+03 VZ =
2.00e+07
2.00e+04
2.00e+07
2.01e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 5] = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Resultof Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07yl = 1.001e+07
vx1 = -9.990e+03vy1 = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
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For the sample points:
x[ 6] = 1.O00e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.90e+03
Error = 2.44e+04
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 2.57e-05
Y = 1.00e+07 Z =
VY = 9.90e+03 VZ =
Y = 1.00e+07 Z =
VY = 9.90e+03 VZ =
2.00e+07
2.00e+04
2.00e+07
1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] - 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.00(_+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03 vyl = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
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**************************************
For the output variables:
y[ 0] = 1.001e+07
y[ 1] = 1.001e+07
y[ 2] = 2.002e+07
y[ 3] = -9.990e+03
y[ 4] = 9.990e+03
y[ 5] = 1.998e+04
For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X =-2.10e+07 y =
VX = 0.00e+00 VY =
Error = 3.82e+07
1 X = 1.00e+07 y =
VX = -9.95e+03 VY =
Error = 9.67e+01
2 X = 1.00e+07 y =
VX = -9.88e+03 VY =
Error = 9.23e-10
0.00e+00
0.00e+00
1.00e+07
1.01e+04
1.00e+07
1.01e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] = 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -l.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vx 1 = -9.990e+03 vy 1 = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ -- 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
Figure 6.4 • Result for a Different Initial Guess (1/8)
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.O00e+02
x[ 8] = 1.O00e+02
Iteration
0 X =-2.10e+07
VX = 0.00e+00
Error = 3.82e+07
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.95e+03
Error = 9.67e+01
2 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.88e+03
Error = 9.23e-10
Y = 0.00e+00
VY = 0.00e+00
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ = 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ O] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.O00e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] - 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vx 1 = -9.990e+03 vy 1 = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
Figure 6.4 : Result for a Different Initial Guess (2/8)
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X = -2.10e+07
VX = 0.00e+00
Error = 3.82e+07
Y = 0.00e+00
VY = 0.00e+O0
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.95e+03
Error = 9.67e+01
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.88e+03
Error = 9.19e-10
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ = 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 5] = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Resultof Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07yl = 1.001e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03vyl = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
Figure 6.4 • Resultfor a Different Initial Guess(3/8)
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = -1.O00e+02
x[ 7] = 1.O00e+02
x[ 8] = 1.O00e+02
Iteration
0 X = -2.10e+07
VX = 0.00e+00
Error = 3.82e+07
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.95e+03
Error = 9.67e+01
2 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -9.88e+03
Error = 9.21e-10
Y = 0.00e+00
VY = 0.00e+00
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ = 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -9.880e+03
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = -1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03 vyl = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
Figure 6.4 : Result for a Different Initial Guess (4/8)
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
I_r_ion
0 X = -2.10e+07
VX = 0.00e+00
Error = 3.82e+07
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 9.67e+01
2 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 9.21e-10
Y = 0.00e+00
VY = 0.00e+00
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ = 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.00(O+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Resultof Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07yl = 1.001e+07zl = 2.002e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03vyl = 9.990e+03vzl = 1.998e+04
Figure 6.4 • Resultfor a Different Initial Guess(5/8)
73
For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
I_r_ion
0 X =-2.10e+07
VX = 0.00e+00
Error = 3.82e+07
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 9.67e+01
2 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 9.22e-10
Y = 0.00e+00
VY = 0.00e+00
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 1.01e+04
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ = 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 1.010e+04
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = -1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07yl = 1.001e+07
vxl = -9.990e+03vyl = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
Figure 6.4 : Resultfor a Different Initial Guess(6/8)
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X =-2.10e+07
VX = 0.00e+00
Error = 3.82e+07
y
VY=
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 9.67e+01
Y
VY =
2 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
E_or = 9.21e-10
1.00e+07
9.9_3
1.00e+07
9.9_3
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ = 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ -- 2.01e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 2.01e+04
u ¸
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 5] = 2.010e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = -1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vx 1 = -9.990e+03 vy 1 = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
Figure 6.4 • Result for a Different Initial Guess (7/8)
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For the samplepoints:
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Iteration
0 X =-2.10e+07
VX = 0.00e+00
Error = 3.82e+07
Y = 0.00e+00
VY = 0.00e+00
X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 9.67e+01
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
2 X = 1.00e+07
VX = -1.01e+04
Error = 9.20e-10
Y = 1.00e+07
VY = 9.90e+03
Z = 0.00e+00
VZ = 0.00e+00
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
Z = 2.00e+07
VZ = 1.99e+04
The solution is:
x[ 0] = 1.002e+07
x[ 1] = 1.000e+07
x[ 2] = 2.000e+07
x[ 3] = -1.008e+04
x[ 4] = 9.900e+03
x[ 5] = 1.990e+04
x[ 6] = 1.000e+02
x[ 7] = 1.000e+02
x[ 8] = 1.000e+02
Result of Checking:
xl = 1.001e+07 yl = 1.001e+07
vx 1 = -9.990e+03 vy 1 = 9.990e+03
zl = 2.002e+07
vzl = 1.998e+04
Figure 6.4 : Result for a Different Initial Guess (8/8)
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7. Conclusion
The Titan II Space Launch Vehicle Digital Flight Control System is modeled using the
Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology. This DFM model of the embedded system can be
used to analyze the system to discover possible failures. This is an attempt to test DFM
on a real embedded system in which the software code is available.
Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology is a tool for analyzing embedded systems in a
"systems" approach. This tool is developed to fill in the deficiencies found in currently
available reliability and safety analysis approaches. These existing approaches generally
follow the philosophy of separating the hardware and software porions in the assurance
analysis. On the other hand, DFM is a tool that integrates in one process the modeling
and analysis of hardware and software components of an embedded system. In addition,
depending on the availability of the software code used in the embedded system, DFM
can focus the analysis on the software design or the software implementation. This paper
demonstrates the latter situation.
The modeling framework in DFM is capable of representing features of modem day
embedded systems. In particular. DFM allows functional, discontinuous, and dynamic
features to be represented in the model. For the Titan II embedded system, the functional
behavior is modeled by process variable nodes, transfer boxes, and causality edges, the
discrete behavior is represented by process variable nodes and conditioning edges, while
the software executions are modeled using the time-transition network. The model
developed will then be used in Step 2 for identifying unwanted behavior. The algorithmic
approach of backtracking and the knowledge base established in Step 1 can allow Step
2 to be automated. This is very important for analyzing a complex system such as the
Titan II embedded system.
One of the steps in developing the DFM model of the Titan II embedded system is the
construction of decision tables. These decision tables represent relationships between
various states of different parameters in the model. In constructing the decision tables
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for subroutinesin the Titan II flight control software, the problem of combinatorial
explosion arises. As each subroutine takes in many input parameters, a huge number of
combinations of these input parameters has to be sampled for each subroutine in order to
complete the entries in the decision table. In addition, the size of the decision table
makes it very time consuming to look up the entries during backtracking of the model.
As the subroutines in the Titan II flight control software implement equations with
distinct physical meaning, it is possible to take advantage of this fact and avoid the
construction of the decision tables prior to the analysis. In backtracking the DFM model
to construct a timed-fault tree, if a subroutine is encountered and certain output values
calculated from this subroutine exist in a branch in the timed fault tree, this subroutine
can be solved in reverse to enter the entries next level down the fault tree. The solving
algorithm is based on the Newton-Raphson Method for solving a system on non-linear
equations, with modifications to account for the difference in the number of unknowns
and the number of equations. In addition, the model developed in Step 1 will indicate
whether switching actions can take place in the particular subroutine. This allows the
appropriate equations to be solved. This approach is applied to one of the subroutines in
the flight control software. The results demonstrate that convergence can be achieved
very rapidly.
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Appendix A Logic Flowgraph Methodology (LFM)
A.1 LFM Concept
The Logic Flowgraph Methodology (LFM) [Guarro and Okrent, 1984], [Guarro, 1988],
[Guarro, 1990] was originally developed as a method for analyzing/diagnosing plant
processes with feedback and feedforward control loops. The LFM models take the form
of directed graphs, with relations of causality and conditional switching actions
represented by "causality edges" and "conditional edges" that connect network nodes and
special operators. Of these, causality edges represent important process variables and
parameters, and conditional edges represent the different types of possible causal or
sequential interactions among them. The LFM models provide, with certain limitations,
a complete representation of the way a system of interconnected and interacting
components and parameters is supposed to work and how this working order can be
compromised by failures and/or abnormal conditions and interactions.
The application of LFM, like that of its derivative, DFM, is typically a two-step process:
Step 1: The construction of a model for the system of interest. This model is built
by first identifying all of the basic process parameters by which the system
behavior can best be described and then by expressing the fundamental
cause-effect interactions (and the conditioning effects on these interactions
effected by faults and operational mode changes) among the parameters.
Step 2: The search for the manner in which specific process states (identified by
the values that certain parameters may assume within the given process)
may occur as the result of the propagation through the system of
perturbations produced by basic root cause events (such as system
component faults or manifestations of process-control logic errors). This
information is ordered in the form of a fault tree using AND and OR
gates. This stage is executable in the form of an automated procedure that
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traces cause-effectrelationshipsbackwards through the LFM network
model.
A.2 Example
The application of LFM to a simple hardware system is illustrated in Figure. A. 1, where
a valve is used to control the flowrate downstream. In Figure. A.l(a), a piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID) is drawn to describe the functional layout of the system,
its components, and other elements of basic engineering data regarding the process. Other
important attributes, most notably the ones linked to operational logic, and control modes
as well as the analyst's own understanding of the system, while not directly contained nor
implicitly expressed in the P&ID, are nevertheless represented in the LFM model of the
system (Figure. A. l(b)). The LFM model is built with physical parameters UP, F, FM,
and VX as continuous variable nodes, where
UP = Upstream pressure,
F = Flow rate,
FM = Flow rate measured,
VX = Valve position at the present time,
and SF and CF as discrete variable nodes, where:
SF = Sensor state,
CF = Control Function.
The relationships between parameters are represented by gains in transfer boxes, which
may be different for different conditions. Edges connect nodes through transfer boxes.
An example of how relationships are represented in the LFM model is the direct
proportionality relationship between nodes UP and F. This is represented by a "/" in the
transfer box between the nodes. The two nodes are connected through the transfer box
using directed edges (Figure. A.l(b)). According to the different degraded states of the
sensor (SF), the relationship between the nodes F and FM may change. This is clearly
shown in the model (Figure. A.l(b)).
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It should be noted that the results of an LFM analysis are obtained in the form of fault
trees, which show how the investigated system/process states may occur. LFM thus
shares, in the final form of the results it provides, many of the features of fault tree
analysis. The difference, however, is that it provides a documented model of the system's
behavior and interactions, which fault tree analysis does not provide directly. The most
important feature of this methodology is that once an LFM model has been developed,
it is not necessary to construct separate models for each system state of interest (as is the
case in fault tree analysis).
In Figure. A.l(c), the fault tree for the top event, "flow rate is high," is derived. By
working backward through the LFM model starting from the flow rate node F, we can
determine that the state, "flow rate F is high," is caused by either "upstream pressure UP
is high" AND "the valve opening is nominal," OR "the valve is completely open." This
information is implicitly contained in the LFM input operator before the node F.
Underlying this input operator is a decision table constructed by determining the states
of F from the combinations of the states of UP and VX. Thus, given a particular state
of F, the information organized in the decision table can be used in reverse to determine
the combinations of UP and VX which cause this particular state of F. This information
is explicitly denoted in the resulting fault tree by connecting events with logical AND and
OR gates.
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Appendix B Dynamic Fiowgraph Methodology Analysis
B.1 Framework for Implementing Step 2
The result of the analysis of the digital control system model developed in Step 1 is
presented as timed fault trees. A timed fault tree takes the form of combinations of
conventional "static" fault trees which describe the system states at different time steps.
Essentially, a timed fault tree is like a series of snapshots of the system evolution, with
each snapshot presented as a conventional fault tree.
Conventional fault tree analysis is very well established in the areas of safety and
reliability analysis. Originally developed at the Bell Laboratory, fault tree analysis has
been used to analyze nuclear power plants [Henley and Kumamoto, 1991], chemical
processes [Lapp and Powers, 1977], and software [Leveson and Harvey, 1983]. It should
be noted at this point that the fault trees derived from a DFM analysis are not limited to
the binary true/false logic of conventional fault tree analysis. Methods have been
developed for finding minimal cut sets (usually called "prime implicants") of multi-state
logic fault trees [Caldarola, 1980].
B.2 Implementation of Step 2
To construct a timed fault tree, we first have to identify a particular system condition of
interest (desirable or undesirable). This system condition is expressed in terms of the
states of the process variable nodes. The DFM model is then analyzed by backtracking
through the network of transfer boxes and transition boxes to find the cause of these
variable states. The information discovered at each step of the backtracking process is
represented in the timed fault trees.
B.3 Example Application
An example of how to construct a timed fault tree from the information provided in the
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DFM model is shown in Figure. B.1. The hypotheticalsystemmodel consistsof 5
Processvariable nodesrepresentingvariablesA, B, C, D, and E, with eachvariable
discretizedinto 3 states(0, 1,2). NodesA andB areinputsto nodeC througha transfer
box, and nodesC and D are inputs to nodeE througha transition box. The decision
tablesarealso shownin Figure.B.1.
Supposewe want to analyzehow E = 2 is reached.This is done by constructing a timed
fault tree with E = 2 as the top event. The timed fault tree is shown in Figure. B.2.
From decision table II in Figure. B. 1, we can determine that E = 2 is caused by either C
= 0 and D = 1, or C = 2 and D = 0. This information is represented in the first level
below E = 2. Note that C, D, and E are linked by a transition box, so in the timed fault
tree we have indicated that there is a time transition between satisfying the states of C
and D, and reaching the state E = 2. Next, we find from decision table I in Figure. B.2
thatC=0isduetoA=0andB= 1, andC=2iscausedbyA= 1 andB=2, orA=
2 and B = O. This information is then represented in the timed fault tree at the next level.
The example just given is simple enough to illustrate how events can be traced to their
cause through transfer boxes and transition boxes. In real digital control systems, there
are usually feedback or feedforward characteristics. This can cause a node to be traced
back to itself in the fault tree construction. Consistency rules must be applied when these
situations are encountered. Unlike established consistency checking rules for conventional
fault trees which only check against static relationships between variables, these
consistency rules must also reflect dynamic relationships; e.g., some variables may not
be able to vary independently in time, but must instead satisfy some function of the other
variables at different times. This dynamic consistency checking may be performed by
developing a rule base, with specific rules for each variable, which reflect that variables
allowed dynamic behavior as a function of time and any other necessary variables, as well
as constraints on the static relationships between variables.
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Appendix C Titan II Space Launch Vehicle Digital Flight Control System
The function of the Titan II SLV Digital Flight Control System [Martin Marietta, 1988],
[Martin Marietta, 1991] is to maintain attitude stability of the vehicle from liftoff to
payload release. The system measures the orientation and acceleration and uses these
measurements to calculate the appropriate engine deflection to maintain flight stability.
The Titan II SLV DFCS consists of the Missile Guidance Computer and the flight control
software, the Attitude Rate Sensing System, the Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), and
the hydraulic actuators. Each of these subsystems will be discussed below.
C.1 Flight Control Software
The Titan II flight control software is made up of three major routines; the Real-Time-
Interrupt (RTI), the Minor Cycle, and the Major Cycle. Each of these routine is
composed of a number of subroutines for carrying out dedicated calculations.
The Real-Time-Interrupt is responsible for reading in data from the sensing devices, i.e.
from the IMU and the rate sensing system, handling telemetry, giving commands to the
hydraulic actuators, and issuing engine shutdown commands. Inputs are read in and
outputs are given out every 40 msec (during powered flight) or 20 msec (during coast
flight).
The Minor Cycle makes use of the data read in during the RTI and the guidance
information supplied by the Major Cycle to calculate the proper engine deflections. The
resulting commands are then issued to the actuators during the Real-Time-Interrupt.
The Major Cycle provides guidance of the flight path. It determines the type of
maneuvers to be executed at a certain phase.
The three major routines share the computer resource in the Missile Guidance Computer.
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The sharingof the computerresourcesis shownin FigureC.1. TheRTI hasthe highest
priority, it is executedevery5 msecandlastsa very shorttime. All calculationsrelevant
to the Minor Cycle andthe Major Cycle aresuspended.When it is time to executethe
RTI, the computerstoresthe addressof the code it is currently implementingand the
results gotten so far. After executingthe RTI, the computerresumesthe calculation
where it left off.
The Minor Cycle has the next highestpriority, and completesevery40 msec during
poweredflight andevery20 msecduringcoastflight. The actualcalculationtime is less
than40 msec/20msec. All thetime left duringthat periodwill beusedup by theMajor
Cycle calculations.
The Major Cycle hasthe lowest priority amongthe threemajor routines. It completes
every 1 sec. Calculationtakesplacein thetime-slot unusedeveryMinor Cycle. All the
majorcyclecalculationactuallycompletesin lessthan1sec. Thetime-slotnormallyused
by the Major Cycle after its completion is dedicatedto backgroundcalculations.
Backgroundcalculationis not relevantto flight control andwill not bediscussedhere.
C.2 The Attitude Rate Sensing System
The Attitude Rate Sensing System consists of gyros. The gyros measure the pitch rate
and the yaw rate of the vehicle.
A schematic of a gyro is shown in Figure C.2. It consists of a float spinning with angular
momentum H in an inertial casing. As input rate to is sensed, the spinning float will
rotate about the output axis according to the physical law O = H x to. Thus, the amount
of angular motion can be determined by measuring the rotation about the output axis.
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Figure C.2 : Schematic of a Gyro
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C.3 The Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
The IMU consists of a platform and associated instruments to measure the vehicle's
acceleration and rotations. The acceleration is measured by the accelerometers, while the
rotation is measured by the synchros. The IMU is shown in figure C.3.
A schematic of an accelerometer is shown in Figure C.4. It consists of a shuttle mass
located inside a case. When the case undergoes an acceleration a, the shuttle mass moves
against the spring due to its inertia. The electromagnet is energized to restore the shuttle
mass back to its null position. A measurement of the electromagnet current needed to
restore the shuttle mass is then a measurement of a.
A synchro is an electromechanical transducer which converts a an angular motion 0 into
a two channel electrical output signal. One channel gives K sin(0-120 °) and the other
gives K sin(0-60°), where K is the instrument's constant.
C.4 The Hydraulic Actuators
The hydraulic actuators are used to deflect the thrust chambers for steering the vehicle.
The limit of deflection is approximately 4.93 °. In Stage I, where there is two thrust
chambers, the schematic for roll, pitch, and yaw corrections are shown in Figure C.5.
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Figure C.3 : The Inertial Measurement Unit
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Figure C.5 • Working of the Hydraulic Actuators
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